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Introduction V - '
An demonstrated by Lutz and White (1988) in their recent review of 
anthropological research in emotion* the interaction between culture emotion 
has recently received considerable attention, both by anthropologists and 
psychologists. The majority of anthropological literature focusing on questions 
of emotion has been written within the past fifteen years or so. The study of 
emotion* as a cognitive phenomenon, has grown along with the development of 
the cognitive paradigm within anthropology. Emotion has been a popular topic of 
research and experimentation within psychology for over a century, but again, 
the movement within psychology from behaviorism to cognitive psychology 
within the past twenty-five years has produced a renewed interest in the 
cognitive aspects of emotion experience, rather than its physiological/behavioral 
manifestations.
While some anthropologists and psychologists have looked at the effect of 
cultural varation on emotional experience, others (primarily within anthro­
pology) have been interested in the role of the cmoFon within the cultural 
experience. Clifford Gccrtz (1973) has described culture as "webs of signifi­
cance” which man has spun and is himself suspended in. "I take . , . the analysis 
of (culturcl to be therefor not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning; emotion forms a part of these webs of 
meaning as at important tool in social inter-action. Feelings and emotions have
been adopted and adapted within cultural contexts as systems of signification that 
can communicate complex meanings. For example, the mixture of sadness and 
levity experienced during an Irish wake is more than a mechanical means of 
individually coping with death; it is a piece of Irish culture forming part of the
symbolism and philosophical outlook of the traditional Irish Catholic. An 
incomplete understanding is gained by either looking at culture without 
considering the powerful force of emotion, or looking at emotion ouUidc of a 
cultural context. Each approach fails to properly acknowledge the interrelation 
between culture and affect. The purpose of this paper is to explore recent work in
the field of emotion research, both psychological and anthropological, and to 
address what seem to be some of the common questions researchers face when 
shaping their ideas about emotion. Too often scholars within one discipline have 
an insufficient understanding of recent findings and theories within the other
discipline that bear upon their own research interests. 1 do not claim to be able to 
summarize all of the recent work done within either psychology or anthropology
that relates to emotion; I do hope, however, to bring out the major points of 
agreement and conflict between the two approaches. Particular attention will be
paid to the question of emotion as universal versus culture-specific, and the 
problem of emotion as a complex phenomenon comprised of both a neuro­
physiological and a cognitive-evaluative system. 1 will look closely at the Ortony 
et al theory of emotion, which which focuses on the cognitive evaluation of 
emotion antecedents, and discuss whether or not this is an adequate or 
appropriate approach to take in the cross-cultural study of emotions. Finally, data 
from the emotional lexicon of the Qucchua Indians will be analyzed in terms of 
the Ortony et. al. model.
History of the Problem
Darwin was one of the first scientists to look at emotion and emotion 
behavior, and his work has inspired many subsequent generations of scientists* 
both supporting and reacting against his ideas. As the title of his book suggests 
(The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) he was primarily concerned 
with the evolutionary adaptiveness of the emotional expressive  response* and 
looked at emotional behavior of both human and certain animals. Unfortunately, 
his cross-cultural data came from what would today be considered
methodologically unsound means of collection; he enlisted the aid of a number of
missionaries, colonial authorities, and others in contact with 'native1 populations
and asked them a set of questions about emotional expression as observed among 
the natives. Much of his descriptions of emotion expression in animals comes 
from his personal observation of domestic animals, including a favorite dog of 
his, and his observations are anthropomorphic at times. He also draws on 
ninctccnth-ccntury work in the physiognomy of the facial muscles, particularly 
that of Sir Charles Bell (1806) and a Dr. Duehcnne (1862).
He proposed that the physiological changes which take place during the
experience of emotions such as "fear” and anger" prepare the individual to react
to a threatening situation with the fight/flight response. Positive emotions and
their behavioral responses (i.c. happiness accompanied by the smite) may serve
to aid interpersonal bonding between mother and offspring, or between members 
of a social unit. Darwin's evolutionary emphasis can be seen in the work of 
sociobiologists, who are interested in the association between emotion and the 
limbic system, or “animal" brain (sec Konrter, for example). Bkman’s
investigation of facial fesponsex eroxx-culturally also comes from a Darwinian 
emphasis on emotional expression as an adaptive response.
The other early influence on the development of research in the field of 
emotion conies from the psychologist William James. His theory, developed 
simultaneously with European psychologist C.G. Lange, considered within the 
scope of emotion only those phenomenon that involve a visceral reaction (heart
rate acceleration, sweatings etc,) accompanying a traumatic experience or 
perception. The "feeling*’ (the perception of  bodily changes within the brain) 
of physiological change "is the emotion" (James, 1884). James’ theorizing was 
based primarily on personal observation and introspection, as demonstrated in 
is question "Cun one fancy the state of range and picture ru> ebullition in the
chest, no flushing in the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the 
teeth* no impulse to vigorous action, hut in their stead limp muscles, calm
breathing, and a placid face? The present writer cannot. ... emotion dissociated 
from all bodily feeling is inconceivable" (James, 1890; italics mine).
Cerebral cortex
Receptor
Viscera Skeletal
muscles
Diagramalic representation of the James-Lange theory 
(From Strongman, 1978: 15)
The Jamcs-Lange theory is not entirely anti-cognitive; James admits that
certain emotions arc under a high degree of cognitive and social control, such as 
shame or regret. However, the "standard" emotions such as fear or rage are under
relatively little cognitive control* lames' influence has lead to a methodological
approach which ignores the mental aspects of the emotkhiai experience as
unanalysable and "nan-scientific," favoring the detectable and quantifiable
physiological changes that form part of the experience. Much research has been
devoted to the search for discrete physiological patterns which exist in a one-on*
one relationship with so-called "basic" emotions. The influence of the Jamcs-
Langc theory can be found today in C\ l/ard's "differential theory" of emotion.
The differential emotion theory posits discrete neurophysiological and expressive
patterns characteristic of each of ten primary emotions. James' conceptualization
of emotions as primarily physiological phenomenon has, as Robert Solomon
argues* stifled anthropological investigation by placing the root of emotion
beyond the realm of cultural influence. An oft-cited example of this reluctance to
treat emotion as a cultural construct is Leach’s reply to Oeertzs assertion that
emotions are "cultural artifacts" (Geett/, 1973:81):
. . .  complete rubbish. I can make no sense of a line of thought which 
claims that "passions" are culturally defined. From my prejudiced 
opinion as a social anthropologist this passage (from Geert/j reveals 
with startling clarity the ultimate radical weakness of the basic 
assumption of cultural anthropology, namely* that not only arc cultural 
systems infinitely variable, but that human individuals are a product of 
their culture rather than of their genetic predisposition.
(Leach. 1981:32)
The dispute between Gecrt* and Leach is, on a small scale, the distillation of 
central debate over the nature of emotion: to what extent is the quality of 
emotional experience controlled by a predisposed biological  component and to 
what extent is it controlled by a cognitive apparatus capable of individual and 
cultural variance?
Emotion has often been described as a combination of arousal
(neurophysiological change) and appraisal (cognitive processing). Following the
•’classical" theories of Darwin and James* much of the research on emotion up 
until the past twenty years has focused on the "arousal” part of the equation. 
Emotion, seen as a "hereditary ‘pattern reaction* consisting of visceral and 
glandular changes enable of motivating behavior (Watson, 1929) fit in well with 
the general bchaviorist paradigm in psychology during this period. The 
popularity of a cognitive psychology since the 1960s has gradually brought about 
interest in a new focus on the "appraisal" pari of the emotional process. The 
careful study of the cognitive dimension of emotion did not receive much 
attention until the !960's, and within past ten years these fledgling theories have 
been expanded upon to the point where today there is a quarterly journal devoted 
solely to the question of the relationship between cognition and emotion. These 
theories stand in opposition to physiologically-based ones which dominated
thinking in the first half of the century. The primary disagreement comes over 
the question of whether the physiologic. I or cognitive component has primacy in 
the emotional experience. Some researchers believe that cognitive evaluation of 
the antecedent situation is the "heart and soul" of. the emotional process, (l.a/arus 
et. al 's cognitive-phenomenological theory, or Ortony et at. theory of emotion 
elicitation) while others believe that the cognitive component is secondary and
merely gives an attributional coloring to the visceral sensations (Ekman, l/.ard, 
etc.) Whether an anthropologist is familiar with and agrees with the older
neurophysiological explanations or the more recent cognitive explanations will 
shape how he or she studies and interprets emotion within a particular social 
context; physiological processes are not subject to the same kind of individual
8(and ultimately cultural) control as cognitive, conscious processes. The structure 
of some of these recent cognitive and physiological/bchavioral theories will he
discussed in detail later on.
Emotion did not receive much attention from anthropological researchers 
until the last ten years or so. Much of this neglect stems from the prevailing 
Jamesian concept of emotion as a biological construct with only a secondary 
mental aspect that is intangible and difficult if not impossible to accurately isolate 
and analyze. The burgeoning body of research on emotion within the cultural 
context has gone hand and hand with recent interest in psychological 
anthropology -• "the anthropology of the self," particularly the interest in 
cthnopsyehology as developed by reseat rs working in the Southeast Asia and 
Pacific culture areas. The major early monographs by Margaret Mead and others
concerned with personality and other aspects of the self within the social 
environment often paid little attention to the issue of emotional experience. Early 
interest in emotion came primarily from Ruth Benedict and her followers who 
investigated the difference between "shame" and "guilt" cultures. Today's 
anthropological investigations may take different directions when considering 
emotion, according to philosophical approach and research methodology. One
popular method of analysis is lexical analysis, which can range from analysis of a 
small subset of culturally focal emotion words (i.e. Rosaldo’s study of anger and 
passion, or Gerber’s work with rage and obligation), to studies of an entire
affective lexicon, with an interest in cross-cultural comparison. Also, emotion
may be analyzed as a cultural institution focusing on the way in which it forms 
part of the unified "web of sense" in social life (sec, for example, the work of 
Avcrili, Briggs, Lutz, and Myers) Catherine Lutz applauds the recent trend
9towards a cultural interpretation for treating emotion ’’as a central aspect ol 
cultural meaning ... embedded in socially constructed categories." (Lutz. I^HH).
This theoretical movement has been called "social constructionism" by some, and 
emphasizes the "moral framework" which gives meaning to emotional 
experience. However, some anthropologists may take an opposite approach, 
characterizing emotion as "a privileged internal domain which may, in theory, 
remain untouched by culture (Lutz, ibid.). This viewpoint sterns from a concept ol 
emotion as a biologically-based innate and universal phenomenon.
Some Definitions: What is an Emotion?
As evidenced by the range of different approaches taken by both 
psychologists and anthropologists when addressing the problem ol emotion, not 
everyone agrees as to what exactly "emotion” refers to. Some have even said that
to speak of "anger" or "jealousy" as if it actually were a unified, analyzablc entity, 
is an "ontological fallacy" (Bedford, IMK6). Others question the need for strict 
definitions, preferring to leave investigation open to any of a number ot related 
affective phenomenon, some of which may not be encompassed within a 
narrower definition of "emotion". Ortony and his colleagues bring up the 
problem of over-indusiveness in a series of papers aimed at sorting out the 
affective lexicon, where they argue that including such phenomenon as feeling 
"tired" or "bored" within an investigation of emotion may lead to misleading or 
trivial results (Ortony and Turner, unpublished draft). By tailoring which
specific lexical items are considered, the results of multidimensional scaling can 
be skewed and can result in misleading conclusions.
There is also a lack of agreement as to what constitutes the data of emotion. 
Several psychologists have written papers on this subject, but the debate has not 
been resolved. Lang separates three observable "response systems" which can be 
used to determine or predict internal emotional phenomenon: somatic changes, 
observable behavior, and verbal behavior or self-report. Physiobiologists take 
measured somatic changes (heart rate, blood pressure, rate of perspiration, 
neural activity, etc.) us their primary data; these patterns are indicative of some 
internal and unanalyzable condition. Some of these measurements are believed to 
be more accurate indices of the internal condition than others. Other researchers
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(including Darwin, Ekman, and l/ard) record behavioral patterns as emotional 
indices -- facial expression, increase or decrease in aggression, bodily posture, 
etc. Based on the data of facial expression, Ekmun has suggested that as least six 
emotions have patterns of facial expression that are recognizable cross-culturally 
(Ekman, 1982). The third data source, probably the most commonly employed and 
certainly the one used most by anthropologists, is verbal behavior and self- 
report. Lang also points out the inadequacy of relying on one data source to 
measure occurrence of emotion (Lang, 1987). Facial expression and other 
behavior patterns can be roughly measured in a field setting, but monitoring 
somatic changes requires a lab set-up which may interfere with or inaccurately 
represent genuine emotional experience.
Reliance on self-reported data has generated interest in the language of 
emotion. Some languages, like English, are rich in emotion vocabulary and have 
a wealth of words differing only subtly in terms of intensity, antecedence, or 
other variables. Other languages, like Gidjingali (an Australian aboriginal 
language), may have a relatively small emotion vocabulary (Mailt, 1978) that
lumps together concepts considered by English to be separate and even
unrelated—for 
shame fulness.
example, the term nurakdj which indicates a state of fear or 
When embarking on lexical analysis, the researcher must address
the problem of domain.  Even in English, which contains the convenient domain
label 'emotion,' it is not easy to draw a line between those words referring to 
emotion and those referring to related affective phenomenon. The validity of 
multi-dimensional scaling based on English emotion vocabulary has been called 
into question because of this luck of discrimination between words genuinely 
describing emotion and those of broader affective scope. The popular theory that
English emotion words vary along a dimension of valence (positive/negative) 
and along an activation dimension (aroused/disintercsted) relies on the inclusion 
of such questionable emotion terms as 'boredom,' surprise', or even 'sleepy' (lor 
example, Plutchik, 1962). This problem, evident enough in English where the
"folk domain" of emotion is generally agreed upon, is exacerbated in languages 
where no overarching category exists which is comparable to our concept of 
emotio n.'
What appears to emerge front this clutter of data is a tripartite theory of 
emotion in which three separate components combine to form the total 
"emotional experience" as viewed by psychologists: the cognitive component, the 
neurophysiological component, and the behavioral component. However, it is a 
mistake to treat one component as if it were a necessarily and sufficient indicator 
of the presence of an emotion. Debate rages within psychology over whether the 
primary component of emotion -- that which is necessary and sufficient for an 
emotion to be said to be present ** is the cognitive aspect or the physiological 
aspect, Schachter, who brings out one of the earliest cognitive theories, believes 
that generalized arousal is given a cognitive attribution that lends particularity to 
the emotion, but that emotion is not felt without the presence of arousal. Later 
cognitive theories (Arnold, I960, and Ortony et aL 1989, lor example) express the 
belief that cognitive appraisal of the individual's situation is constantly taking 
place, and this process of evaluation occurs before physical arousal or the 
cognitive perception of arousal can take place. Although Izard recognizes that 
emotion is a "complex motivational phenomenon with characteristic 
neurophysiological, expressive, and experiential (what wc would here call 
cognitive) components (1981), he later states that the emotion process originates
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and is a primary function of the somatic nervous system, likman, who has 
concentrated his research on the behavioral manifestation of emotion, considers 
the behavioral aspect of the experience to be primary. Others, such as Mandler. 
have argued a intermediate position, where physiological arousal (which occurs 
without cognitive mediation, and which Mandler proposes is the result of task 
interruption) requires cognitive evaluation to take on its characteristic 
"emotional" tone. I/ard places Mandler's ANS activity in a tangential relationship 
to emotion, giving somatic activity (facial expression and muscular tension) the 
role of primary emotion activators. Despite the disagreement over the relative 
importance or necessity of the various components involved, there is some 
general agreement that, in the usual case, an emotional experience involves 
sort of physiological arousal (including stimulation of the nervi
some
glandular system, and musculoskeletal system) and cognitive
UUs system, 
Pcr« p t i , , n „r
arousal, cognitive appraisal of the emotion*inducing situation
' *-*l»arac,cri*,ic
expression including facial, postural, and vocal patterns.
Cognitive and Neurobehavioral Theories in Psychology
Emotion theory until the 1960s was dominated, like much ol the rest of 
psychology, by behaviorist dogma. The studies of Arnold (I960) and Schuchtcr 
and Singer (1962) were the first major theories which placed significant 
emphasis on the cognitive aspect of emotional experience. Most approaches
which incorporate a cognitive element are some variation of "arousal/appraisal”
theory: emotions are a combination of generalized arousal and cognitive
evaluation which is responsible for the specificity of the feeling. The
relationship between the two aspects has been poorly explored, lor the most part, 
although recent publications have made advances in explaining this relationship. 
George Mandlcr's proposal comes closest to accounting for the interaction 
between arousal and cognition; arousal (activation of the autonomic nervous 
system) results when established goals or behavior patterns are interrupted or
blocked. ANS activity is perceived as "external to the mental system" which is 
constantly monitoring the body for changes in levels of ANS activity. Once a 
change is noted, it is attributed to events in the externa! environment, taking on
its characteristic valence from this cognitive evaluation. The conscious
perception of emotion is the conjunction of these two unconscious processes in a 
Gestalt-like process. Furthermore, Mundlcr proposes that events to which ANS
activity are attributed are mentally flagged as significant in the organism's 
consciousness and subsequent memory. Mandlcr's theory, while providing a 
relationship between physiological and cognitive processes in the experience of
emotion, does not sufficiently explore the structure of the cognitive, or evaluative 
aspect of emotion. A few researchers have offered more detailed explanations of
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the cognitive workings of emotion (for example the cognitive-phenomenological 
analysis of Lazarus, Kanncr, and Lolkman, 1982; and Ortony, ('lore and Collins’s 
theory of the cognitive structure of emotions, 1989).
Melvin Konner states explicitly the philosophical groundings of a number 
of other researchers interested in the biology and physiology of emotion, rather 
than its cognitive elements. "Anatomy may not be destiny, but it is all we bring 
into this world... in this intricate, dense, moist web of cells we carry around with
us (and not any airy thing attached to it) lies the substance of all the love and
hate, joy and grief, hardheaded analysis and excited imagination we experience 
during our sojourn on this planet. And it is only because certain cells make
signals, chemical and electrical, to communicate with each other, that we arc able 
to think and feel at all" <p. 5‘M, Implicit in this approach is the positivistic 
attitude that everything about emotion can eventually be deduced (with the help 
of necessarily technological advances) by studying the biological structures 
which give rise to it. Konner uses this approach to develop an essentially 
Darwinian evolutionary concept of emotion in which its capacity to motivate is of 
central importance. However, Konner errs in his analysis by failing to 
discriminate sufficiently between genuine emotional and other motivational 
phenomenon such as sex drive or aggression. His conclusions are based largely 
on the analysis of lust and aggression, both of which certainly have emotional 
aspects, but are not emotions in and of themselves.
A final theoretical approach of interest to anthropology is CM:. Izard's
differential theory, first postulated in 1972 and reiterated since then in much of 
Izard's writing. The differential theory attempts to account for all three 
components of emotion in an attempt to understand both its innate and acquired
characteristics, It puts emotion within an evolutionary framework in which 
there are ten basic and universal emotions which developed as the most important 
part of Homo sapiens' motivational system: interest, joy/enjoyment. surprise, 
distress, disgust, anger, guilt, shame, fear, and contempt. The proposed emotions 
are unique and discretely characterized by particular patterns of neurochemical 
activity and expression (particularly facial). The emotion system is one of five 
interrelated ‘personality systems”: the emotion, motor, homeostatic, perceptual,
and cognitive systems. The differential theory, because of its concern with 
developmental processes, has been warmly received by a number of researchers 
investigating the development of emotion from a cross-cultural, comparative 
perspective. In writing *’ ' postscript to an issue ol Ethos devoted to exactly this 
question. Izard states "The experiential component of the emotion state is a quality 
of consciousness, or feeling, and at this level the emotion state is invariant across 
cultures. The differential theory isolates this fee  tin#, a ’quality of consciousness 
that characterizes the particular emotion" from the associated cognitive processes 
which are "greatly influenced by culture" (1M83:.VI0).
The Question of Universality
The principal dash between traditional and more recent psychological 
theories and anthropologists looking at the question of emotion comes down to 
this: to what extent is emotional experience a universal phenomenon? While 
many psychologists have been searching for a set of "universal emotions" 
which are expressed and perhaps linguistically encoded pun-culturally, 
anthropologists have been pressing towards a particularism contextual 
understanding of emotion phenomenon. What does it mean for an emotion to 
be "universally expressed"? I? man believes he has gathered a list of emotions 
whose unique facial expressions can be documented in all cultures. The 
Ortony et at model, while dismissing the idea of "basic" or universal emotions, 
does tentatively offer a model of emotion elicitor categories that provides a 
universal basis for emotion types (though not emotion words). They admit that 
the validity of their proposal does not rest on the presence or absence of 
lexical representations of each of their categories in languages cross- 
culturally, citing Wcir/bicka's {1 > observation that a lack of a particular 
emotion term in a given language does not preclude native speakers ability to 
feel that particular emotion.
A universal structure of emotion may affect anthropological research in 
the way universal structures in linguistics. The proposal oPdcep grammars" did 
not flake a significant change in anthropologists study the social uses of 
language within a particular society. In the same way, the debate over 
universality may not have great importance to certain lines of anthropological 
inquiry. Much of the recent anthropological analysis has investigating symbolic
uses of emotion and feeling within the larger contest of social discourse. These 
analyzes often locus on a group of culturally fin al affects; even though the 6-10 
’’basic emotions** proposed by the various psychologists may be lexically present, 
they are often not the emotions to which great cultural significance is ascribed. 
The emphasis is shifted away from finding what is universally basic and towards 
finding what is culturally basic. Examples of this research focus include Michelle 
Rosaldo’s analysis of "rage' or "passion" among the headhunting Mongols, and 
how these concepts form part of the Mongol understanding of human social 
development. Kosaldo also calls into question the idea, put forward by Weir/bicka 
and others, that emotions which are not lexically encoded may still be fell or 
expressed; ’’that the Balinese no more feel "guilt” than we feel lek% the Balinese 
emotion closes to our "shame" -* and that these difference |sic| relate to how we 
think about the world *• is to me, equally clear.” (Rosaldo, 19X2). Rosaldo, heeding 
the call put out by Gcertz in the opening chapter of The Interpretation of Culture. 
argues that while there may be some limited sense of universality in the nature of 
emotion and self-concept, it is the particularities that are interesting, and it is 
the anthropologist’s job to discover and record these particularities.
Understanding human phenomena is necessarily a cross-disciplinary 
endeavor. Framing the question in terms of correct approaches (whether it is the 
psychologist’s concern with universal or the anthropologist’s concern with 
differences across cultures) prematurely dismisses the idea that each discipline 
has something to contribute to our understanding of the whole phenomenon. I 
feel that the chief contribution that anthropology has to make in the 
understanding of emotion lies in the systematic documentation of emotion use in 
’’real world” naturalistic settings. Emotion, regardless of its physical or
evolutionary origins, functions in ’rear' contexts as a source of information and a 
means of communication.
The communicative aspect of emotions has not been fully explored by 
either anthropologists or psychologists. Emotions communicate information in 
two ways: they provide a means ol communication between the cognitive system 
and the lower functions of brain and body (this idea is similar to Mandlers
interruption theory), and they provide a means of communication between two 
individuals in the social setting. In the concept of the "triune brain", the brain is
composed of three levels of activity, each localized within particular structures 
and each related to the process of evolution from the simple nerve centers of the 
invertebrates to the complex capabilities of the human cortex. The lowest of these 
strata is the "reptilian brain" which is responsible for basic locomotor patterns, 
regulation of autonomous activity such as breathing and heart functions, and so 
forth. The most important structure of the "mammalian brain" is the limbic
system, a region which has often been connected with the "non-rational" aspects 
of emotion and motivation. The cortex is the primary structure of the "primate 
brain", The cortex is present in the brains of mammals and lower animals, but it 
is dominated by olfactory, visual, and other sensory processing centers. In 
primates the frontal lobe, associated learning, memory and cognition, is much 
larger and more developed than in the lower animats. Emotion, taken as a whole, 
involves all three areas of the brain; ANS and somatic arousal triggered by the
reptilian brain, "feeling" and behavioral motivation triggered by the limbic 
system, and cognitive appraisal within the cerebral cortex. It should be noted 
that one structure thought to play an important role in the limbic system, the 
corpus collosum, is also important in the process of communication between the
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two hemispheres of the cortex. It is not certain whether the system functions to
alert the cognitive faculties of important changes in the bodily environment, or
to alter the bodily environment to cope with the perceptions and appraisals of the 
cognitive system. In all likelihood, information Hows both directions in a cycle of
biofcedback.
At the same time that emotion links activity across the various regions of 
the brain and motor systems, emotion behavior communicates aspects of our 
internal state to other individuals whom we are in contact with. A person’s
emotional state, as interpreted by an observer, can be used consciously or
unconsciously to alter the interaction between the two people. l/ard, el at (1984)
use the example of a lover's sulkiness bringing about the acquiecence of a 
partner, or the disappointment of a supervisor bringing about the increased 
efforts of a subordinate. The expression of rage communicates certain culturally 
appropriate behavioral responses to the observer, whether the enraged
individual consciously intends to or not. There is little agreement as to the extent 
to which this interpersonal communication is dependent on biological factors 
(Ekman's universal smile) or on shared cultural symbols and values. Interest in
cultural specificity need not deny some degree of pancultural similarities, just as 
belief in a universal language ability need not deny the fascinating diversity of
linguistic practice. The literature on developmental and socialization processes 
deals with the communication of emotion, and to some extent emotion as a 
specialized means of communication.
Cultural variation in the expression of affect is one of the most readily 
observable yet least easily interprctable aspects of human behavior, As a 
communication system, affective expression is the inverse of linguistic 
expression: while in language the linguistic symbols are considered 
arbitrary carriers of meaning, affective expression is perceived as
embodying meaning itself. We arc not surprised when we cannot 
understand the speech of a person whose language we do not know, but we 
assume that an adequate translation would convey a meaningful message to 
us, Observing the affective behavior of a person from a different culture, 
however, we "know” what is meant, but arc sometimes unable to understand 
why a person should act in that way. | I9K3:215-16|
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Expressive behavior may be able to communicate the presence of an emotion 
across cultural barriers, but what an emotion "means" in the social context is 
unavailable to the outsider. Culturally significant emotions and their "meanings" 
can often be the most difficult concepts to translate across cultural and linguistic 
barriers. This is the problem Michelle Kosaldo addresses when she says "The 
assumptions bound to our familiar tonus ol psychological explanation prove 
attractive yet inevitably problematic when confronted with a cultural account" 
(M. Kosaldo, IUH3). Rcnato Kosaldo returned to this problem of emotion meaning 
and translatability years later, saying
When Mongols told me, as they often did. how the rage in bereavement 
could impel men to headhunt, I brushed aside their one-line accounts as 
too simple, thin, opaque, implausible, stereotypical, or otherwise 
unsatisfying. . . Not until some fourteen years after first recording the
terse llongot statement about grief and a headhunters rage did I begin 
to grasp its overwhelming force. |I981): 3|
Comparison with other research problems in cognitive anthropology
One possible goal for the anthropological study of emotion would be to 
come up with a systematic model of lexicalization and categorization along the
lines of the thorough work done with color classification by Berlin and Kay. 
Berlin's work is a useful example because, in addition to arriving at a universal 
pattern, this pattern is accounted for in terms ol restraints that the underlying 
biological structures place upon the surface manifestation ol perception.
Applying this approach to emotion, one might look at the range of emotion 
possibilities as a continuous spectrum which is broken up, with observable
regularities and occasional novelties, into discrete units for cognitive processing. 
Such a theory would mesh best with an A NS activation conceptualization, such as
Mendlcr's, since the range of ANS activity can be thought of as continuous 
variance along a limited number of variables.
Another related line of research within cognitive anthropology is in the 
field of "folk" classificatory systems. Most research in this field has looked at 
systems of  classification of Bora and fauna, illness and disease, and other domains 
whose Western "folk theories'' are the Natural Sciences. Catherine Lutz has looked
into folk classifications of emotion among the Ifaluk; her scalar models based 
upon native groupings of various emotion terms vary greatly from traditional 
Western models. Just as understanding folk theories of botany does not mean to 
challenge the Western science of botany, neither does an understanding of folk 
theories of emotion mean to threaten the findings of Western psychology.
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The Orlony, G ore, and Collins Theory: General Goals
The definition of emotion which Qrtony et al use in The Cognitive 
Structure of Emotion claims that emotions are "valenced reactions to events,
agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in 
which the eliciting situation is construed" (p. 13). As with most working 
definitions of emotions introduced in the context of a theory of emotion, the 
Ortonye/ al definition is not so much a reflection of general consensus within the 
field of psychology as a product of their particular thinking on emotion within 
the framework of their theory. Although the view of emotions as valenced 
reactions is widely accepted, the locus on reaction to different categories of 
stimuli plays a particularly important role in the development of the Orlony et al 
theory. The authors wisely point out that the adequacy of their definition is 
ultimately reliant on the adequacy of the theory. The definition places emphasis 
on those aspects of emotion that are considered central to their theory, and by
extension those aspects that the authors consider of central importance in the
study of emotion.
h is interesting, before delving into the heart of this approach, to consider 
what the authors are reacting to or against in their writing: those investigations 
which they feel inaccurately or at least inadequately account for the
phenomenon of emotion. They cite two major research paradigms that have 
developed within the field within the last thirty years: one focusing on arousal 
and appraisal, and the other focusing on dimensional scaling of emotion concepts, 
with attention paid to the dimensions of activation and valence. First addressing 
arousal/appraisal approaches, they criticize the lack of attention paid to the role
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of cognition and the murkiness with which the cognitive component defined.
They also find other theories fail to provide an adequate explanation of how the 
cognitive component interacts with the other components in the emotional 
experience, and what mechanisms enable this interaction. Mandlcr’s theory is
better than most in addressing the cognitive component but it docs not adequately 
explore its realization in individual emotions, particularly positive ones. Their 
disappointment with dimensional scaling approaches stems from, first, their 
reliance on emotion words without sufficient control on what denotative 
variables of the word (intensity, situational antecedents or consequences, etc.) 
arc actually being clustered by research subjects. Elsewhere they have criticized 
the lack of discrimination between emotion states and other affective or cognitive 
states when choosing terms for dimensional scaling studies. Furthermore, Ortony
et al feel that the discovery of only two generally-agreed upon dimensions in the 
characterization of emotion (valence and arousal) to be "as uninformative as it is 
unsurprising" (p. 7). Such generalized dimensions of a generalized affective 
domain do let to help characterize the nature of emotion experience.
Of the widely varied sorts of emotion theories being offered (physio­
logical, behavioral, expressive, and so on), many focus on what Ortony et at feel
to be the functional consequences,  from the communicative role of facial 
expression to the adaptive responses of withdrawal/avoidancc during fear. They 
do not satisfactorily address the origins  of the various types of reactions, which 
Ortony et al ultimately place within the realm of cognition. Many of these 
investigations propose a limited number of "basic" emotions which can be 
identified by universal or ncnr-univcrsul physiological or behavioral reactions, 
without explaining why many of the concepts considered emotions, both in
English or in other languages, tail to manifest such adaptive manifestations 
(pride or shame, for example).
By focusing on cognition, Ortony et at are not denying the existence or
importance of other facets of the emotional experience which are the source of
the theories they are reacting against. However, they do make the claim the the
cognitive facet is the ontological!) primativc source of emotion - that all emotion
is first the result of cognitive processing -- an appraisal of environmental stimuli
which is both arbitrary and valenced.
. . . emotions arise as a result of certain kinds of cognitions, and we 
wish to explore what these cognitions might be. The physiological, 
behavioral, and expressive aspects of emotions seem to us to 
presuppose that this first, cognitive, step lias already taken place.
Certainly, these aspects would be crucial to a complete answer to the 
question of what an emotion is, but we think they are less central to 
answering the question of where emotions come from.
The Structure of the Theory
The Ortony et al theory avoids making claims about emotion words, basic 
emotions by speaking instead of emotion types, distinct kinds of emotions that 
share certain defining characteristics, though individual tokens  may vary from 
each other in intensity or other narrowing qualities. For example, English 
speakers recognize the emotions such as "fear,” "terror," "worry,” "nervousness," 
and "stage fright" as all expressing a certain sense of "fear-ness" or 
apprehension about an incipient event They differ from each other in intensity 
(fear vs. terror), specific eliciting situation (xenophobia v.v stage fright), and 
expected reaction (worry v.v panic). This cluster of related emotions is referred to 
by the authors as "fear-type" emotions, an emotion-type which is well-lexicallized
in English, along with the joy-type emotions, the distress emotions, and other 
types. However, some of the emotion-types proposed have few or no lexical tokens
in English: the relief-type emotions include only the token "relief.” and the
"fears-confirmed"-type emotions contains no English tokens at all.
The authors then propose a ciassificatory scheme in which emotion-types 
are grouped together according to the specification of eliciting conditions. The 
three classes of eliciting conditions proposed arc events* agents, and objects This 
tripartite division is thought to reflect a basic wa\ human cognition divides the 
world, or those parts of it which we believe affect us. They believe this holds true
at least for English speakers -- whether this assumption holds up when applied to
data from other cultures will be one of the chief areas of discussion in the final 
section of the paper. Emotion is the result of the cognitive appraise of the
relationship between the subject and the eliciting condition. We may experience
emotions when attending to the consequences of events, the actions of agents, or
the static aspects of objects. Each of the three main elicitation classes is further 
subdivided according to criteria individual to that class. Eor example,
"consequences of events" can be divided into emotions focusing on "consequences 
for other" and "consequences for self'. Consequences for other" may be 
separated into "desirable for other” and undesirable for other". Although valence 
is a defining characteristic, emotion-types are not classified according to valence, 
as in other theories. Pride-like and shame-like emotions may be polar opposites
in terms of valence, but according to the Ortonv et at conceptual scheme, they 
both fall within the category of emotions focused on the action of a self-agent.
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Intensity  V ariables
The second theoretical thrust is an analysis of the variables affecting the 
intensity of emotion types. Certain variables arc global,  influencing the 
intensity of feeling across all three broad categories. Bach category also has
associated with it a particular, central variable related to the category’s structural 
nature. I-vent based emotions are uniquely influenced by the desirability  of the 
event. Agent based emotions by the praiseworthiness  of the agent, and Object- 
based emotions by the appealing ness of the object. Desirability is measured in 
terms of complex goal structures ‘the authors provide a valuable interface 
between the literature on goal souctute and the literature on cognitive appraisal
in emotion). Praiseworthiness rs evaluated with respect to standards, and 
appealingness is -evaluated wilt respect to attitudes (degree of liking or disliking.
Bach central variable has a logical negative counterpart; undes irab i l i ty , 
blameworthiness, and unappealtngness The increased desirability of an event 
would have a positive aflcvt on positively valenccd Bvcnt-based emotions (i.e. the 
more desirable the event, the greater the hope or satisfaction experienced, 
without taking into account other variables) and a negative effect on negatively- 
valenced emotions (obviously, the more desirable the event, the less one would
fear  it). A persons goals, standards, and attitudes share a degree of relation with 
each other in that these central variables are generally long-standing, highly 
internalized qualities that depend on the emotion cxperienccr
Two other classes of intensity variables are proposed: global variables 
which influence the intensity of emotion experience across all three major 
branches, and local variables which affect only particular groups (such as WELL-
BEING, emotions, for example). The authors, in proposing variables, limit their
task by mentioning only variables which directly altcct the intensity, and not
variables which alter intensity by affecting another more general variable.
They use the example of charm, which certainly might affect the intensity of
Attraction emotions, but only indirectly through its inlluence on appealingness.
The global variables posited are: sense of reality, proximity. unexpectedness and 
arousal Local variables affect only rticular groups of related emotions, lor 
example, desirability for otJ. ir dr  serving ness. and Itkim* may alter the intensity
of the "fortunes-of-others" cmoti-ms (happy-for, pity, gloating, resentment, etc.)
For each proposed emotion-type. the authors have provided detailed 
structural descriptions, based primarily on their own intuitions, but supported by 
preliminary research. For each structural description, the author* r wide the 
type specification, English tokens (taken from list of 270 emotion words selected
in previous research by (More, Ortony. and Foss on the emotional lexicon ol 
English), variables affecting intensity, and a specific example of of the emotion 
in conjunction with an appropriate eliciting condition. For example, the 
structural description of "hope" emotions (hope being as neutral a term lor the 
class as possible) looks like this:
HOPE EMOTIONS
TYPE SPECIFICATION: (pleased about) the prospect of a desirable event
TOKENS: anticipation, anticipators excitement, excitement, expectancy, hope,
hopeful, looking forward to, etc.
VARIABLES AFFECTING INTENSITY:
(1) the degree to which an event is desirable Idesirabilityj
(2) the likelihood of an event
EXAMPLE; As she thought about the possibility of being asked to the nance, the girl 
was filled with hope.
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Hope-type emotions are Event-based emotions to which prospect is relevant. The
ncgat ive 1 y- v ale need counterpart emotion-type for this category i>i the Fear-type
emotions
FEAR EMOTIONS
TYPE SPECIFICATION: (displeased about) the prospect of an undesirable event
TOKENS: apprehensiveness, anxious, cowering, dread, fear, fright, nervous, petrified,
scared, terrified, timid, worried, etc.
VARIABLES AFFECTING INTENSITY:
(1) the degree to which the event in undesirable lundesirability|
(2) the likelihood of the event
EXAMPLE: The employee, suspecting he was no longer needed, feared that he would be 
fired.
These two examples of emotion types have almost identical type specifications and 
intensity variables, the only difference between them being valence.
By outlining this theory, Ortony et at have hoped to gel away from theories 
based on English emotion terms, particularly those that prescribe a handful ol 
"basic’* emotions. Secondly, they wish to offer a classificatory scheme which is 
more dcscriptively-rich than ones based on two fundamental scalar dimensions, 
arousal  and valence. In doing this, they feel they have arrived at a culturally 
universal model of the cognitive aspect of emotions (they do not attempt to address 
universality issues of physiological patterning, facial expression, and other noti- 
cognitivc aspects). The portion of their theory which they believe will be the
most universally applicable is their most basic assumption:
that the particular classes of emotions that will exist in a culture depend 
on the ways in which members of that culture carve up their world. We
have suggested that in our culture, the main divisions are between 
events, the actions of agents, and objects. However, should there be
cultures, or other species for that matter, that do not, for example, focus
on the actions of agents, then we would predict that they would not,
indeed could not, experience Attribution emotions.. ... Differentiations 
within these three classes can vary easily from one culture to another
simply as a result - of the fact that the boundaries between different
classes of variable values may be culturally determined. |p. 175-176}
This statement is a departure front most propositions of universality in that it does 
not propose any particular types of emotions as being universal, even those 
which have been carefully outlined through the rest of the hook. It departs from 
researchers such as Weir/bicka, who claims that though certain emotions may not 
be universally (or even commonly) lexicalli/ed, they may be nonetheless felt by 
an individual even though his particular language does not provide him with the
vocabulary to discuss his experience <without resort to metaphoric description).
By claiming that the cognitive structure of emotion grows out of the way we 
cognitively structure the world. Ortons et al open the door lor dialogue between 
those studying ideas of self, causality, and world-conception, and those more 
narrowly focused on the study of emotion. This interlinking conceptuality, of the
sort Clifford Cicertz calls for in The Interpretation of Cultures and demonstrates in
"Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” could help draw together different aspects of
cognitive activity into a unified domain. The authors do not seem alarmed by the 
fact that some of their proposed emotion-types have few, if any, lexical items in 
English. Their theory docs not stand or fall upon the presence or absence of 
tokens in any given language. Though they stop short of making this claim, the 
absence of tokens in a particular branch or a sub-branch of the model may 
indicate something about the assumptions made by members of a culture when 
conceptualizing the world.
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The Range of Umolion Terms in Quechua
Quechua is spoken today by over 12 million people in Peru, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and even in parts of Colombia, Chile and Argentina. Ibis language 
originated in the Andes and has since spread throughout much ol western South 
America, The language is divided into two major families of dialects, each of 
which is comprised of many dialects (such as the Aymara-influenced dialect
spoken in bilingual Quechua/Aymara regions of the Bolivian altiplano  or 
Quichua dialects spoken in Amazonian and Andean Ecuador). The data for this 
paper comes primarily from the Cusco dialect, which the Cuscertos consider to be 
the "proper". form of Quechua, in the same way that "the King’s English" is 
maintained as "proper" English, or the Erench officially sanctioned by the 
National Academy. The Cusco dialed is also somewhat richer in grammatical 
structures, some of which have fallen out of use among the geographically distant 
Quechua-speaking peoples.
Quechua is a suffix-based language; a limited number of stem morphemes 
can take on a wide range of nuances depending on the affixaPon of different
suffixes. In addition to serving the grammatical I unction ol indicating tense, 
subject-verb agreement, plurality, possession, part ol speech, and marking a 
direct or indirect object, suffixes also may serve the function ol preposition, or
conjunction. Suffixes can indicate that something is done quickly, that pleasure
taken in doing something, and a number ol other distinctions. there are three or 
four different wass to indicate doubt using suffixes, and hall-a-do/en different 
kinds of emphatic suffixes, Suffixes can differentiate between information
gained by first-hand observation or by indirect sources, they can express
politeness or rudeness, or they can indicate that what is being said is sincerely 
felt by the speaker. The range of suffixes in Quechua is interesting to the 
researcher of emotion because some of them may carry a definite emotional 
overtone. For example, the idea of happiness or pleasure in acting can be 
incorporated into almost any intransitive verb by the addition of the sullix ku, 
which serves in other contexts as a reflexive.
In a general sense, the -ku suffix carries u connotation ol internalization 
or self-involvement "insideness" and also of intensity or profundity When 
applied to the intransitive verb "to cat" im tk h u y ). it means "to eat with great 
pleasure or satisfaction" imttkhukus)  However, when applied to the intransitive 
verb "to fall" iunnay)  it means to fall inside something," such as a hole or a cave
(urm akuy ). When added to a transitive verb such as "to grind" ikutay)  it makes 
the action reflexive, in this case "to grind for oneself." In other cases, the 
reflexive functions grammatically more like the reflexive -se or "self" (to hurt 
oneself, to dress oneself) in Spanish and Fnglish. respectively In general, the 
Quechua language carefully encodes the source of action and the recipient of 
action through suffixes.
Another suffix of interest in the analysis of emotion is the suffix chi. 
which changes intransitive verbs into transitive (an excellent example is w ahuy  
"to die" becoming wahuthiy  "to kill"). When added to transitive verbs, it means 
"to cause someone to do something tor or to oneself" (nurim hichiy to have 
someone kill for oneself," to hire a hit-man. lor esample). To use an example from
the emotional lexicon, the basic root ha tear" can become manchakuy  "to
1e#  fear, to be frightened" or manchai h t \  "to cause someone fear, to frighten 
someone/’ Like all Quechua suffixes, meaning is highly dependent on context.
The -i hi suffix is often used when speaking of emotion to indicate that someone 
else is the root cause of one’s emotional slate: for example ruwasqaykt  
Uakichiwanki "what you are doing makes me sad, saddens me" illakiy, to be sad). 
This example also demonstrates the pronominal  conjugation, used to indicate 
precisely the subject and object of the verbal action. In this case, ~h<i ind icates
that the object, or recipient, of action is the 1st person singular, and ~nki
indicates that the subject, or originator, is the 2nd person plural. The direction of 
action is "from you to me".
The result of this is a large range of possible permutations from a limited 
number of core affective roots. Although the Quechua language does have a
respectable number of root morphemes that can be considered affective, the truly 
expressive nature of the language can be demonstrated by the number of subtle
variations in meaning possible with the use ol sullixes. Prom the root morpheme
kusi-> an almost infinite number of possible derivations are possible. Kusi is the 
adjectival form; kusikuy is the basic verb form, and can also be used as a noun; 
kusichiy is to make someone happy, or to entertain; k u \ ip a \a v means to be happy 
for someone else; kusiyay means to become happy. Kusikuypuni  adds an emphatic 
suffix, and kusikuypuniyii  is doubly-emphasized, meaning something along the 
line of "How could I be anything but very happy!". Suffixes can also impute non* 
affective words with emotional qualities such as sincerity and "heart-feltness" 
Thus, wahukapuy  means "to die." but also carries the connotation that the speaker 
is emotionally involved in the death, and wishes to speak about it in a polite 
fashion. Wahuy  is used to refer to the death of animals, but it is considered rude to 
use ill association with humans Similarly, takiy means "to sing." but taktkuy  
means to sing with great pleasure, to sing happily
Although Ortony et al caution against theories of emotion words, it is 
impossible to analyze the conceptualization of emotion among Quechua-speakers 
without paying attention to the grammatical forms with which they express 
themselves. Like many languages, Quechua does not have a word for the category 
we consider "emotion" (although some speakers use sintikuy , from Spanish sentir  
'to feel.' with a corresponding noun form sint ina , or feelings ). The dividing 
line between general affect terms, emotion terms, and non affective terms, which 
Ortony and his colleagues have tried to establish for English words, is not very 
clearly drawn. But most important to this analysis is the fact that the nature ol 
the emotion elivitor is not always contained in the root connotation, but in the 
connotation of a variable suffix. The same root can be applied to valenced 
reactions towards more than one of broadest groupings in the model. For
example, mam hariy may icfcr to fear of an undesirable event, but it is also 
commonly used to refer to fear or awe of a powerful individual, such as tear ol 
God.” Kusikuy likewise may refer to happiness or joy at the consequences of an 
event, but people as agents may also cause one to feel kusikuv. A moments 
reflection will reveal that the equivalent English terms behave similarly.
Here Ortony et al might argue that one individual emotion term is being 
used to describe more than one emotion-type, and that the types themselves 
remain solidly fixed as either Event-based, Agent-based, or Object-based.
Following this reasoning, when mam hariy  is used to describe tear ol an incipent 
event it relers to a different emotion-type than when it is used to describe Icar or 
respect of a powerful person. The difficulty that here arises is that of testability. 
Although preliminary empirical research was used to select the words included in 
the lexicon of English emotion tokens, the general theory was not subjected to
similar empirical testing to determine the validity of the general structure. The 
final chapter on the boundaries of their theory mentions ’preliminary 
experiments designed to determine how well English emotion words fit into the 
various emotion categories*’’ tp 173) but does not mention the structure or results 
of those preliminary studies.
The authors give sttuctural descriptions for twenty different emotion types
based upon the terminal nodes of their branching model. The model includes 
three sub-complexes under the ’consequences of events'1 branch: the individual 
may focus on the consequences of the event for either the self or for the other, 
and if the self is the focus, then the prospects may be either relevant or 
irrelevant. The well-being emotion group in comprised of event-appraisals 
focused on the consequences for the self, where prospects are irrelevant: this 
group includes the joy emotions (pleased about a desirable event), and the distress
emotions (displeased about an undesirable event).
The structure of the prospect-based group is more complex - three
valenccd pairs are proposed. These include the unconfirmed prospect pair, hope-
type (pleased about the nrospect of a desirable event) and fear-type (displeased 
about the prospect of an undesirable event). For confirmed prospects, there are
the satisfaction-type (pleased about the confirmation of a desirable event) and the
fears-eonfirmed-type (displeased about the confirmation of an undesirable 
event.) Finally, when prospects are discontinued, one may be displeased about 
the disconfirmation of a desirable event (disappointment-type) or pleased about
the disconfirmation of an undesirable event (relief).
When the outcome of the event affects someone other than the self, the 
third complex of event-based emotions come into play. One may be pleased about
an event desirable for someone else ("happy-fur" type emotions), displeased about 
and event desirable for someone else (resentment type), pleased about an event 
undesirable for someone else (gloating is the closest English gloss), or displeased 
about an event undesirable for someone else ("sorry-for" type emotions).
The ’"actions of agents" branch has only one sub-complex, the attribution 
emotions. The agent may be either the self or another, and the appraisal of the 
agents action may be cither praiseworthy or blameworthy. The appraisal of 
one’s own actions as praiseworthy results in the pride-type emotions (approving 
of one’s own praiseworthy action), while the appraisal of one’s own actions as 
blameworthy results in the self-reproach-type emotions (disapproving of one’s 
own blameworthy action).
The authors propose a compound emotion-complex between the attribution 
and w'cll-being emotions. Thus, the compound of approving of someone else’s 
praiseworthy action and being pleased about a desirable event results in the 
compound emotion-type ’gratitude”, while disapproving of someone else’s 
blameworthy action combined with being displeased about an undesirable event 
results in the anger-type emotions. Approving of one's own praiseworthy action 
coupcd with being pleased about a desirable event produces the gratification- 
types, and disapproving of one’s own blameworthy action while being displeased 
about an undesirable event produces remorse-type emotions.
Finally, the ’’reaction to objects" emotions have a very simple structure, 
comparatively. The object can be appraised as cither appealing (like/love-typc 
emotions) or unappealing (dislikc/hale-typc emotions).
APPRAISAL OF EVENT (PROSPECTS IRRELEVANT)
DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE
pleased about a desirable event displeased about an undesirable event
APPRAISAL OF PROSPECTIVE EVENT
STATUS OF EVENT DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE
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UNCONFIRMED pleased about the prospect displeased about the prospect 
of a desirable event of an undesirable event
CONFIRMED pleased about the eonfirma- displeased about the confir- 
tion of the prospect of a de- mat ion of the prospect of
sirabie event an undesirable event
DISCONPIRMED displeased about the dis* pleased about the disconfir* 
confirmation of the pro- mation of the prospect of 
pect of a desirable ''vent an undesirable event
APPRAISAL OF EVENT (VALUE OTHER)
REACTION OF SELF DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE
PLEASED pleased about an event pleased about an event unde- 
desirable for someone else sirabie for someone else
DISPLEASED displeased about an event displeased about an event 
desirable for someone else undesirable for someone else
APPRAISAL OF AGENTS ACTION
AGENT PRAISEWORTHY BLAMEWORTHY
SELF approving of one’s own disapproving of one’s own 
praiseworthy action blameworthy action
OTHER approving of someone disapproving of someone 
else’s praiseworthy action else's blameworthy action
1 attempted to obtain a fairly extensive catalogue of affective words and their
permutations Tor the Cusco dialect or Qucchua. The majority of my data comes 
from interviews with Luis Moratd Pefta, a native speaker from Bolivia and 
professor of Quechua at the University of Illinois. Professor Moratd is the author 
of a textbook for the Cusco dialect, and is currently compiling a tri lingual 
dictions* y. I also received assistance from his son, Luis Moratd Lara, who has 
been assisting his father In translating the textbook into English. Moratd Lara is 
also a fluent speaker of Quechua. An attempt to classify individual tokens from 
the Quechua emotion lexicon yields the following results:
APPRAISAL OF EVENT (PROSPECTS IRRELEVANT)
DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE
ackiy 'to enjoy', kusikuy ’to be happy anchiy 'to grieve*
q'oehu 'unbridled happiness or joy* hunk’usqa kay 'to be depressed or dejected
samikuy 'to be satisfied’ ttakl- 'sadness, sorrow, misfortune'
usachikuy to enjoy oneself musphakuy *to be upset, bewildered, stunned'
noft'ay 'to suffer*
pAuliy 'great sorrow’
q’oymiy 'to be dicontcnt, to loathe'
rukupakuy _ ‘to be wrapped in sorrow or grief
umachakinpa 'dejected, crestfallen’
umphu 'dispirited, crestfallen’
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APPRAISAL OF PROSPECTIVE EVENT 
STATUS CF EVENT DESIRABLE 
UNCONFIRMED suyay 'to have Hope, to wait*
CONFIRMED samikuy 'to be satisfied*
DISCONFIRMED qheparikuy 'to despair,
to be discouraged* 
q§aymachikapuy ’to be dis­
illusioned'
UNDESIRABLE
eh'eqmikuy *!o be bothered or 
restless*
llakdany ’to be apprehensive, anxious' 
mane ha- ’fright, danger’ 
musphariy 'to be worried, stunned* 
q'achakuy ‘to be terrified' 
khuyapakuy 'to feel sorry for oneself
q'amparamanakay 'to be depressed'
APPRAISAL OF EVENT
(VALUE FOR OTHER)
SELFS REACTION DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE
PLEASED kusipayay 'to be happy for someone*
DISPLEASED chikikuy 'to envy* khuyay ’to be sad for someone'
envldlo 'to envy* Uakipayay 'to sympathize with'
ma nap ay ay 'to envy repeatedly’ Uuliay 'to console' 
moq'ey *cnvy'
tumpanakuy 'to be jealous, envious'
APPRAISAL OF AGENTS ACTION
AGENT PRAISEWORTHY BLAMEWORTHY
SELF upmsqachay \o be vaii ’ £'jimM5</a 'humiliated'
umaorqariy *tp be haughty nanachikuy 'to regret’ (when one's
Some of the Ortony et  a/"s categories are heavily Icxicali/cd, while others 
appear to have few tokens. As in English, existing words can be combined or 
altered to express emotions otherwise without lexical tokens. For example, the 
Qucchua language lacks a term to express 'pride' in the sense of "approval of one's 
own praiseworthy actions" or 'gratitude* in the sense of "approval of someone 
else's praiseworthy actions." These emotions arc denoted by using a common 
grammatical construction "my actions make myself happy" or "your actions make 
me happy" (where "action" can be replaced by the verb describing the particular 
action.) Although individual tokens to exist to describe appraisals of blameworthy 
actions, these emotions can also be described using this construction: "your 
actions make me sad." The words which might be glossed as ‘pride*, umaoqari  and 
a p u s q a c h a y ,  both carry a negative connotation, with the sense of "taking on 
airs.” t do not doubt that Quechua-speakers feel the positive sensation that
OTHER 
actions of
or prideful
APPRAISAL OF OBJECT 
APPEALING UNAPPEALING 
eheqniy 'to hate' 
millakuv '10 abhor, detest' 
q’oymiy 'to loathe, he discontent'
tulukuy 'to love without limit 
mu nay 'to love, desire*
accompanies a job-well-done, bui it is considered poor manners to boast about 
one's accomplishments or otherwise overtly display excessive pleasure with one's 
own good work,
The problem with this analysis is that, although the data from Qucchua can 
be analyzed in terms of a particular model, such an application does not shed 
much light on the experience of emotion within the Quechua culture or how 
emotion is understood by speakers of Qucchua, In fitting the data to a "scientific" 
model, the social context is ignored. Despite the range of available emotion terms 
varying subtly in meaning, much of "emotion talk" is conducted using variations 
on only a few core roots: l l ak i  sadness' and kus i  'happiness’ arc used very 
frequently to cover a variety of emotional situations; c h e q n i y  'hate' and m u  n a y  
like’ or love' are used to cover not only many degrees of appealtngness or 
unappeaUftgnesx, but also approval or disapproval of another's actions. L l a k i .  in 
fact, is one of the central affects of Qucchua culture, as indicated by its 
pervasiveness in folksong, often associated with wa^ay 'to cry,* which is the 
culturally constituted expression of llaki. Kusi also places a c u l t u r a l l y  central 
role -  it can be used to sum up just about any positive emotion which is not 
otherwise lexically encoded (such as the example above of ’pride*). Dividing the 
lexicon into Event'based. Agent-based, and Object-based types of emotions is 
diOletsit in a language such as Qucchua where mutable stem concepts seem to slide 
around between categories, deluding on their attached suffixes. A second short* 
coming of the analysis is that is docs not deal with the emotional quality of certain 
suffixes.
Conclusion
Emotion is an extremely complex phenomenon, and a paper of this size 
cannot attempt to do justice to the range of thinking within either the 
psychological or the anthropological discipline. Lutz and White’s recent review 
of the anthropological literature includes almost 200 citations, and the body of 
literature in psychology is significantly larger than that. What I hope has 
emerged from the discussion of various theoretical approaches is an emphasis on 
the three components of the emotion experience: cognitive, neurophysiological, 
and bchavioral/expressivc. Neurophysiology is a biological ’’given” that play* 
some restraining role in the structure of emotion. However, within the 
constraints of the physical machine there is room for a great deal of variation. 
Cognitive psychologists have investigated the constraints of brain architecture 
on human speech capabilities, or the restrains of the visual aparatus on color 
pcrccption/classification. Despite these physiological constrains, there is still 
possibility for individual and cultural variability. Likewise with emotion; the
universal characteristics of the ANS arrousal system or of the cognitive aparatus 
still leave room for rich and fascinating cultural diversity in the experience of 
emotion. "Folk classificatory schemes' of the domain of emotion range in scope 
from rite ?*word system of the Cidjingati aborigines to the 270 words Ortony e i  a i  
feet constitute the emotion lexicon in English. Research in cognitive psychology 
and related disciplines is constantly advancing our understanding of the nature 
of human cognition as constrained by brain architecture; emotion as a partly- 
cognitive phenomenon can be better understood by understanding how the brain 
functions. However, anthropologists are interested not only in how emotion
works inside the mind and body of (be individual* but how it works between 
individuals on the level of social interaction. Language, in the context of social 
interaction, becomes discourse •• a source of rich cultural meaning. In the same 
way, emotion can be appropriated for use as a vehicle of cultural significance.
Emotion as a biological system has evolutionary roots as a system of 
individual motivation, but it also functions as a system of communication.
Emotion within cultural contexts is often communicated through words, and so 
lexical analysis remains a valuable tool for the anthropologist. But emotion is also 
communicated through expression, gesture, and toneof-voice. Songs, stories, 
and poetry may communicate very definite emotions without overtly mentioning 
emotion: for example, Mongol headhunting songs (Rosaldo, 1979), Bedouin 
women's poetry (Abu*Lighoud, ???). or the short Quechua songs of sadness and 
crying. The lexicon provides a map for charting emotion experience within a 
culture, but to look at the map without holding it up to its social context will give 
only a partial understanding of experience. The rich cultural meaning with 
which emotion words, concepts, or behaviors can be imbued must be found 
through the observation of emotional processes. These processes can be a part of 
any cultural activity, from "simple" interpersonal communication (a spat between 
brother and sister) to elaborate ritual contexts (the prescribed emotions of the 
Irish wake or the llongot headhunting expedition). Emotion is an important part 
of life experience, one which varies between individuals and between cultures.
For the anthropologist attempting to understand in some degree the life 
experience of another group of people, emotion offers an often-overlooked source 
of data in forming that understanding.
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is now used more frequently as an emotion term; in fact, it is difficult to tell which 
is the original and which is the derived context.
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A
as in 
hat
O i ch i n
CHH ranch ho use (asp ira ted )
CH’ check (glottal stop )
E y d lo w
H hot
1 k ilchen (sy lla b le -ce n tra l)
W£gd (sy lla b le - in it ia l)
K Lin (sy lla b le - in it ia l)
Lot ( s y 11 a b 1 e - 1 e r m i n a 1
KM black he ad
K Leen (glottal stop )
L lady
LL teiljLO u
M m o th e r
N 0.0
$ c a n v o n
0 ban c
P ao o r
PH topJiat (asp ira ted )
P* aony (glottal stop)
Q -  go (ulvular stop)
QH -  foghorn (aspirated ulvular
Q -  go (glottal stop)
R too t
S sad
T Lie
TH kn ig h th o o d (asp ira ted )
T lea (glottal stop))
U rg le
W MLC
Y £0U
Stem D er iv a tiv e s
a c h iy to enjoy
all in good
allinpaq hap'iy  to commend, approve of (lit. "utilize for the good")
a n c h i y
a p u -
a s i y  
a t i -
c h e q n i
c h i k i -
c h ' e q m i
a l i i n y a y  relief, to be relieved; to prosper or be cured (lit. "to
make or become good""to make things go well”) 
to be disgusted (by the actions of another), led up with completely; to 
loathe 
to grieve
a general cxclamitory
thanks!
gratitude; to thank
to be proud, vain, or haughty (lit. “make a god of ) 
to be proud of oneself (lit. "make a god of oneself*)
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a h a y c h a y  
deity, god 
a p u s q a e h a y  
a p u s q a c h a k u y  
laugh, smile 
force, ability 
a t i p a k u y
hate (also c h ' e q m i )  
c h c q n i k u y  
c h e q n i n a k u y  
c h e q n i p a k u y  
separate 
c h i k i k u y  
annoyance, bother 
c h ' e q m i k u y  
c h ' u s k u  hair (animal)
c h ' u s k u l t i k u y
violence 
to hate
to hate each other 
to hate constantly, to hate strongly
to envy
to be annoyed, bothered, sleepless, restless
to envy (fr. Spanish)
to become briefly furious (lit. 
on end)
e n v i d i a  envy
e n v i d i a k u y  
h u e  h a  sin, guilt, fault
h u c h a c h a k u y  (B), huchallikuy (P) to sin 
h u c h a p a k u y  to sin repeatedly, to be delinquent
h u c h a s a p a  person who commits many sins
h u c h a y o q  guilty person
h u n k ' u  with legs drawn in, doubled up
hunk'usqa  kay to be depressed or dejected 
k a r a - (also k ' a r a )
to be exasperated
to stand one's hair
k u s l
k h u y a
k a r a l l i k u y  
happy 
k u s i k u y  
k u s i  k a y  
k u s i c h i y  
k u s i p a y a y  
k u s i m a n a y
k ' a m i y
to be happy
to be happy (kay, to be) 
to make someone happy 
to be happy for someone 
to be unhappy (mana, not, no)
~ compassion, empathy
k h u y a p a y a y  to take pity on somonc, be generous
k h u y q k u y  to be kind, have compassion
k h u y a y  to be sad for someone; admire, respect
k h u y a q  s o n q o  sympathetic, generous person (lit.
“compassionate hearted")
k h u y a m a n a y ,  k h u y a m a n a s q a  sympathize with, pitiable 
k h u y a p a k u y  to feel sorry for oneself 
to insult or get mad at someone
.. ■' 4 7
Vara* burning sensation. hate
V araU ikuy to be furious
V a ra l l i ch ty to offend, to make angry
k 'umu bent-over, stooped. slouching
k 'umusqa hum iliated
V a m u c h i y to humiliate
Vutuy bite with the incisors
k 'u tu p a ku y a show of anger, demonstrated anger (possibily
from "to show the teeth"?)
lu lu - caress, pet
lulukuy, lulunakuy to love without limit
luy lu amiable, pleasant. nice, thoughtful
llaki- sadness, sorrow, misfortune grief
Hakiy , Uakikuy to be sad
l lakimana a sad or sorrowful person
l lak ich iy to cause another sorrow or grief
U a kip ay ay to sympathize with
l lak ipakuy despair, moan, wail
llaklla- trem b le
l lakllay to sense, feel, tremble
l lak l lapakuy to be terrified
l lak l lach iy to cause anxiety
i lakllar iy to be apprehensive, anxious, cautious
llaktla sonqo to be jealous (lit. "trembling heart")
(lamp *u smooth, silky
damp*a sonqo always calm (lit. "smooth hearted")
llanita fresh, green (plants)
i lanltay to be fresh, full of energy, sprightly
l lanllariy sp rig h tly n css
Hulla-il) l ying
l lullay to console
l lu l laykuy to console oneself
m a k i • h a n d
makil lana eagerly (lit. "right away, with only the hands")
mana- not
m anapayay to envy someone repeatedly (? to not have)
m a n c h a - fright, danger
m a n ch a y fright (also, awe)
m a n c h a r iy fear
m a n c h a r ik u y to be afraid
m a n c h a c h iy , mane hach ikuy  to make someone afraid, to frighten
milla- ugl y
m il lakuy disgusting, detestable; to detest, abhor
m illapakuy repugnance, strong disgust
millaymanaspa qhaway to gloat (lit. "being not ugly, to look")
m o q e y e n v y
m u n a * love, want
m u n a k u y to love
m u n a p a k u y covetousness, to be selfishly desiring
m uspha - stun, confuse
muspkariy  to be worried, stunned
muspkakuy  to be bewildered, upset, confused
muspharichiy  to upset, to stun
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muki- 
hak 'a
nana-
hapa-
kuk'a
p i t i
suffocate
mukikuy to restrain one's emotions
to suffer
nak'ay, kak'arly, kak'artkuy to suffer 
hurt
nanacklkuy  to regret (one's actions cause oneself pain)
kapakuy to be anxious, to feel anxiety
one-armed, paralysed
huk'asqa helpless . defenseless
few, little
plslekakapuy  disdain, despise, scorn, berate (lit. "to belittle, to
make small'')
pisickasqa scorned, dejected
pkihay  to storm, bluster, or be stormy
pkika  
pkihakuy  
pkikapakuy  
pklkackly  
pkutiy  great sorrow 
p ' taqa  sham e
p'tnqayckay
p'$nqakuy
p'tnqackiy
p'oiqo Miter, sour
p'otqoUltqakuy 
f a i l  calm  
j k i p a  neat, future
qktparikay  
$ ‘att scary, fearful
angry, annoyed 
to get angry, to resent 
to be angry for a long time 
to provoke
shame
to he embarrassed or •shamed 
to put to shame, to embarrass
embittered
to despair, to be discouraged, to slay behind
q'amporamcaay 
q ’aqcka
d'aymn 
q'ocku
become discouraged 
a'amparamanakuy to be depressed 
terror
q'aqckay to terrorise
q'aqckasqa terrified
p'apckakay  to be shocked, terrified
tasteless, bland
a'aymacktkapuy to be disillusioned 
q'aymakuy. q'ay may, q'aymarayay to be indifferent 
unbridled happiness, joy
q'oekurikay  to be happy
q'ackakay  to enjoy oneself, rejoice, celebrate
r u k u p a y
s a m i
s a p a
s a q e y
s a q r a
s i n t i
s o n q o
s u y a y
t a p h y a
t a r a n t a y
t u m p a
t k a k
m u
t ’o q y a
uma
u m p h u
USO
u t i
q ' o y m t p a k u y , q ’oymipuy  to be completely fed up with 
wrap up completely
r u k u p a k u y  wrapped in sorrow or grief
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happy, lucky, blessed 
s a m i k u y  
only, alone 
s a p a n c k a s q a  
s a p a n c h a k u y  
leave
s a q e p u y  
bad, evil spirit 
s a q r a c h a k u y
s i n t i k u y
heart, conscience, spirit
s o n q o  k ' i r i y  to be heartbroken 
s o n q o  n a n a y  
sonqo  p h a l a i a y  
sonqo  I'ikay 
k h u ya q  s o n q o y  
hatun s o n q o y  
s o n q o l l i k u y  
s o n q o c h a k u y  
to wait 
s u y a k u y  
forboding
to be startled, uneasy
to be satisfied 
lonely
to feel lonely 
to despise 
to be enraged
tantrum, to get annoyed, feel resentful
spiritually hurt (lit. "heart pain") 
to be shocked by bad news flit, "rapid heart beat") 
to be very happy (lit. "the heart blooms, flowers") 
having a generous or sympathetic spirit 
generous (lit. "big hearted") 
to be inspired
to take courage, buck up one’s spirit
to have hope, to hope
t a r a n t a c k l y  
a little 
t u m p a y  
t u m p a n a k u y  
peaceful, tranquil 
tkak kay  
t kak n i sqa  
wild but tamable 
t U U a y k a c h a y
t ' o q y a k u y
head
u m a c k a k i n p a
to excite, to startle
accuse, make Jealous, a jealous accusation 
to be jealous/envious/possessive
to be tranquil
peace (lit, "saying peaceful”)
to be touchy, cautious and aprehensive
explode in anger
dejected, crestfallen, hang one’s head 
(lit, "head towards the feet") 
to be haughty or prideful (lit. "to lift the head")u m a o q a r i y  
dispirited, crestfallen 
(probably from Sp. u s a r )
u s a c h i k u y  to enjoy oneself
stunned, astonished, amazed
u t i r a y a y  to be amazed, astonished, fascinated
Quechua Affective Vocabulary and Related Words
Some Notes on the Glossary
The words listed arc certainly not the only variants possible on the stems here 
listed. They represent only some or the more common derivatives (Le., some stems 
occur commonly with or without the -ku suffix with little change in meaning, 
while with some stems the addition of the ~ku suffix acts in its more general role of 
reflcxivization of a transitive verb, and in these cases the -ku variant is not listed) 
and cases where the suffixai element changes the meaning of the stem in an 
unusual way. For example, all verb forms can be changed to the past participle 
form and used as an adjective by replacing the infinitive suffix -y with the past 
participle suffix * $ q a% and these loans are not listed. In many cases the basic verb 
form can also function as a noun (i.c. k u s i y , either Hto be happy” or "happiness"). 
Another common grammatical transformation is noun conversion by adding *f or 
•Jtfyoq, giving the sense of "someone (or something) which possesses quality X. 
These forms are not listed either.
Some words squire their affective component through metaphorical 
usage. Obviously, not ail metaphorical emotion descriptors can be included here, 
since speakers are capable of constantly producing new metaphorical usages. 
However, some of the more common metaphoric uses are included here, especially 
ones which refer to the physical "sensations” associated with the emotion by 
Quechua speakers, in some cases, it is difficult to tell whether the affective usage is 
a metaphorical extension of the original non*affective use, or the other way 
around: for example, p h l t e ,  a stem used to refer to anger, or us blustery moons. It
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